Aurorisk FR

STPA: systems safety analysis

Analyse the safety of a complex system through its control loops (STAMP/STPA, Leveson): losses and hazards, control structure, unsafe control actions, loss scenarios, STPA-Sec and a comparison with HAZOP, FMEA, fault trees and bow-tie. A tanker unloading case, two demos, activities, graded exercises and quizzes. Course taught entirely in English.

Graded quizzes, exercises and interactive tools are available in the online course.

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At a glance

Level
Intermediate
Estimated time
about 9.5 h
Audience
Systems and safety engineers, students who already know a classic analysis method.
Recommended first
Industrial risk and dependability
Learning outcomes
  • Define losses, hazards and the control structure of a system.
  • Identify unsafe control actions.
  • Build loss scenarios.
  • Compare STPA with HAZOP, FMEA and fault trees.
Assessment
A graded quiz for each chapter; in a group, the next chapter opens once the lessons are read and the quiz passed (60% by default, threshold set by the trainer).
Badge
Digital badge (Open Badges format) issued by the trainer once every quiz of the course is passed and the final exam passed at 70%: 20 random questions, 30 minutes, at most 3 attempts, 24 h between two attempts.
Updated

Course outline

Lessons marked “free to read” need no account; the other lessons, the exercises, the quizzes and the answers do.

Chapter 1Why a systemic approach4 of 4 lessons free to read

The limits of the causal chain, accidents without a failed component, the STAMP model and a first look at the STPA method on the Vauclair depot case.

Chapter 2Framing the analysis and modelling the control structure5 lessons

Steps 1 and 2 of STPA: losses, hazards and safety constraints, then the control structure of the Vauclair case.

  • 2.1The losses to avoid
  • 2.2System hazards and safety constraints
  • 2.3Reading and building a control structure
  • 2.4Process model and level of detail
  • 2.5The control structure of the Vauclair depot

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Chapter 3Unsafe control actions4 lessons

Step 3 of STPA: the four ways a command can be unsafe, writing a UCA with its context, the grid for the Vauclair case and the controller constraints.

  • 3.1The four types of unsafe control actions
  • 3.2Writing a UCA: context is everything
  • 3.3The UCA grid of the unloading station
  • 3.4Controller constraints and common mistakes

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Chapter 4Loss scenarios5 lessons

Step 4 of STPA: why a UCA can occur, why a correct command may not be executed, the five zones of the control loop and their translation into requirements.

  • 4.1Two families of scenarios
  • 4.2Controller-side causes: algorithm and process model
  • 4.3Feedback, actuator, process and communication
  • 4.4The scenarios of the unloading station
  • 4.5From scenarios to requirements and measures

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Chapter 5STPA-Sec, comparison and implementation4 lessons

Extending STPA to cybersecurity, placing the method relative to HAZOP, FMEA, fault trees and bow-tie, then implementing it: tools, lifecycle, limits.

  • 5.1STPA-Sec: the same approach for cybersecurity
  • 5.2STPA, HAZOP, FMEA, fault tree, bow-tie
  • 5.3Implementing: team, tools, lifecycle
  • 5.4Limits, common mistakes and summary

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