Chapter 1 · Lesson 1.1
The causal chain and its limits
Most dependability methods look for what can fail, then for what the failure causes. This works well for components, much less for systems where accidents come from interactions between elements that work.
- Explain why an accident can occur without any component failing
- Define constraint, control loop and process model (STAMP model)
- Place the four steps of the STPA method
The chain-of-events model
An accident is often described as a sequence of events: an initial cause, intermediate causes, a top event, consequences. This is the picture behind fault trees, bow-ties and the causal tree. It assumes two things: causes can be traced back step by step, and each event is a fault (failure, error, deviation).
| Assumption of the model | What it allows | What it leaves out |
|---|---|---|
| Accidents have a root cause | Targeting the corrective action on one point | Accidents with multiple causes that are not linked to each other |
| Components fail randomly | Calculating probabilities (λ, PFD) | Design, specification and software flaws |
| Component reliability makes safety | Redundancy, maintenance, testing | Reliable components that interact badly |
| Operators are a source of errors | Procedures, training | The context that made the operator’s action reasonable at the time |
Where it falls short
Today’s systems combine software, automation, operators and organisations. Software does not wear out: if it has a flaw, it had it from the start, and it will execute it faithfully. A failure probability calculation then makes no sense, yet the risk is very real.
A component can be perfectly reliable (it always does what it was designed to do) and still be dangerous, if what it was designed to do does not match the real situation. Failure-centred methods do not see this case.
- The causal chain describes component failures well, interactions poorly.
- Software has no failure rate: its flaws are design errors.
- The reliability of a component is not enough to guarantee the safety of the system.