Chapter 1 · Lesson 1.3
STAMP: safety as a control problem
STAMP (Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes) is an accident model proposed by Nancy Leveson (MIT). It replaces the question “which component failed?” with “which safety constraint was not enforced?”.
Three ideas
- Constraints. Safety is a property of the system: it is maintained by enforcing constraints (“the product stays in the circuit”, “two incompatible products are never brought into contact”). An accident occurs when these constraints are not respected.
- Control. Constraints are enforced by hierarchical control loops: a controller (PLC, operator, site manager, regulation) acts on a process and receives feedback.
- Process model. To control, every controller holds a model of the state of the process. If this model diverges from reality, decisions become dangerous.
What this changes
| Question | Causal chain model | STAMP |
|---|---|---|
| Nature of a cause | Failure, error | Constraint not enforced |
| Role of the operator | Source of error to be framed | Controller whose decision depends on their model and on the information received |
| Software | Component that can fail | Controller whose algorithm may be inappropriate |
| Organisation | Remote cause | Higher control level, with its own constraints and feedback |
Definition
An unsafe control action (UCA) is a command that, in a given context, leads to a system hazard. It is the central object of the STPA method.
References: N. Leveson, Engineering a Safer World, MIT Press, 2011; N. Leveson and J. Thomas, STPA Handbook, MIT, 2018 (freely available). STAMP has also given an accident analysis method, CAST, presented in the course Accident analysis and lessons learned.
Key takeaways
- STAMP sees an accident as the result of constraints not enforced by control loops.
- Every controller acts according to a process model; a wrong model is a cause of accident in its own right.