Aurorisk FR

Industrial risk and dependability

Major industrial hazards, risk assessment, dependability and analysis methods (PHA, FMEA, HAZOP, fault trees, bow-tie). Quizzes and graded exercises. Course taught entirely in English.

Graded quizzes, exercises and interactive tools are available in the online course.

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At a glance

Level
Introductory
Estimated time
about 26.5 h
Audience
Engineering and master’s students, engineers new to process safety.
Recommended first
none
Learning outcomes
  • Explain major-accident regulation and the notion of risk.
  • Carry out a PHA, an FMEA and a HAZOP on an industrial case.
  • Build a fault tree, an event tree and a bow-tie.
  • Assess a risk level and place it in a matrix.
Assessment
A graded quiz for each chapter; in a group, the next chapter opens once the lessons are read and the quiz passed (60% by default, threshold set by the trainer).
Badge
Digital badge (Open Badges format) issued by the trainer once every quiz of the course is passed and the final exam passed at 70%: 20 random questions, 30 minutes, at most 3 attempts, 24 h between two attempts.
Updated

Course outline

Lessons marked “free to read” need no account; the other lessons, the exercises, the quizzes and the answers do.

Chapter 1Industrial risks: major accidents, regulation and dependability5 of 5 lessons free to read

What an industrial risk is, the major accident and its three types of effects, the four pillars of French policy, the Seveso Directive and the hazard study, then operating risk (breakdowns, shutdowns, non-major accidents) and the two logics of safety and dependability.

Chapter 2Accident scenarios, effects and lessons learned5 lessons

From loss of containment to effects on targets: approach, bow-tie, fire, explosion and toxicity models, historical accidents and systemic causes.

  • 2.1Analysis approach and accident scenarios
  • 2.2Fire, explosion and toxic risk
  • 2.3Lessons learned: consequences and causes of accidents
  • 2.4Historical disasters and lessons learned
  • 2.5Systemic causes: cindynic deficits

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Chapter 3The notion of risk and risk level assessment6 lessons

Definitions (ISO 31000), source-flow-target model, scenario, severity, likelihood, criticality, acceptability matrices and the order of 29 September 2005.

  • 3.1Definitions: risk, source, target, hazardous phenomenon
  • 3.2Scenario, risk level and criticality
  • 3.3Assessing severity
  • 3.4Assessing likelihood
  • 3.5Risk matrices and acceptability
  • 3.6The risk management process (ISO 31000)

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Chapter 4Dependability5 lessons

RAMS, probability refresher, reliability and failure rate, bathtub curve, MTTF, exponential and Weibull laws, reliability block diagrams and reliability data.

  • 4.1Dependability and a probability refresher
  • 4.2Reliability, availability and failure rate
  • 4.3Bathtub curve, MTTF, MTBF and MTTR
  • 4.4Exponential and Weibull laws, parameter estimation
  • 4.5Reliability block diagrams, availability and reliability data

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Chapter 5Functional modelling5 lessons

What modelling means, breaking down into systems and interactions, functions, components and steps, the SIFC table: the common basis of risk analysis methods.

  • 5.1What is modelling?
  • 5.2Breaking down into systems: boundaries and interactions
  • 5.3Functions: what the system is for
  • 5.4Components and steps: with what, in what order
  • 5.5The SIFC table and the link with the methods

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Chapter 6Preliminary hazard analysis (PHA)6 lessons

The principle of PHA (MIL-STD-882E), the step-by-step approach and how to read the table, two worked examples, R1 to R4 colour scales and matrix, six forms of risk mapping, guide lists developed by hazard family and by life phase.

  • 6.1PHA: principle, objectives and place in the approach
  • 6.2The step-by-step approach: how to fill in the PHA table
  • 6.3Worked examples
  • 6.4Rating scales and the colour risk matrix
  • 6.5Risk mapping: several forms of representation
  • 6.6Detailed guide lists: hazards and undesirable events

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Chapter 7FMEA6 lessons

Principles and variants of FMEA, the step-by-step approach, rating scales and action plan, two complete examples (pump unit, safety shut-off valve) and guide lists of failure modes, causes, effects and detections.

  • 7.1FMEA: principles, definitions and variants
  • 7.2The step-by-step approach: how to do an FMEA
  • 7.3Rating and criticality: scales, thresholds and action plan
  • 7.4Detailed example: the pump unit
  • 7.5Second detailed example: safety shut-off valve on a gas line
  • 7.6Guide lists: failure modes, causes, effects and detections

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Chapter 8HAZOP6 lessons

Principle, guide words and guide lists, running a study step by step, two worked examples (liquid transfer, exothermic batch reactor) and choosing between PHA, FMEA and HAZOP.

  • 8.1HAZOP: principle, vocabulary and place in the life cycle
  • 8.2Guide words, parameters and deviations: detailed guide lists
  • 8.3The step-by-step approach: running a HAZOP study
  • 8.4Worked example 1: a liquid transfer circuit
  • 8.5Worked example 2: a batch reactor with an exothermic reaction
  • 8.6Comparing PHA, FMEA and HAZOP: choosing the method

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Chapter 9Fault trees, event tree and barriers5 lessons

Build a fault tree, find the minimal cut sets, calculate the probability of the top event, follow the consequences with an event tree, barriers with PFD and confidence level.

  • 9.1The fault tree: purpose, symbols, construction
  • 9.2Qualitative analysis: minimal cut sets
  • 9.3Quantitative analysis: probability of the top event
  • 9.4The event tree
  • 9.5Safety barriers: roles, PFD and confidence level

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Chapter 10The bow-tie, from sketch to calculation5 lessons

The bow-tie of the R33030 reactor built at four levels of detail: choosing the central undesirable event, simplified version (threats, barriers, escalation factors), detailed version with logic gates, quantified version and position in the grid, then barrier management over time.

  • 10.1What the bow-tie is for, and where to place the central undesirable event
  • 10.2Simplified version: threats, barriers, consequences and escalation factors
  • 10.3Detailed version: logic gates, events and barrier types
  • 10.4Quantified version: frequencies, PFDs and position in the grid
  • 10.5Using the bow-tie: critical barriers, degradation and follow-up

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