Chapter 1 · Lesson 1.6
Risk assessment: identify, analyse, evaluate
Assessment comprises three steps: identification, analysis, evaluation. The techniques covered in the other courses fit into it naturally.
Updated: October 2026. Sources: text of ISO 31000:2018, 6.4; IEC 31010:2019 (catalogue of techniques, from the publisher’s pages).
Risk identification (6.4.2)
Purpose: find, recognise and describe the risks that may help or prevent the organisation from achieving its objectives, including those whose sources are not under its control. Examine sources, causes, events, vulnerabilities, changes in context and signs of emerging risks, without forgetting biases and assumptions of the people involved.
- List the hazard sources (products, energies, equipment), the areas of impact (people, property, environment), the events, causes and consequences, then the scenarios.
- Draw on historical data (the BARPI’s ARIA database, the site’s own operating experience), theoretical analyses and expert opinion.
- Val-des-Pins : PHA by zone, HAZOP of the loading station; scenarios: BLEVE under thermal attack, leak on a loading arm, tank overfilling, leak on a pump flange.
Risk analysis (6.4.3)
Purpose: understand the nature of the risk and its characteristics, including its level where appropriate. It examines uncertainties, sources, consequences, likelihood, events, scenarios, controls and their effectiveness. One event can have several causes and consequences and affect several objectives. The analysis can be qualitative, quantitative or a combination depending on the intended use, the reliability of the information and the resources available.
- Differences of opinion, biases, the quality of the information and the assumptions all influence the analysis: they should be documented and communicated to decision makers.
- The standard notes that highly uncertain events are hard to quantify, particularly when the consequences are severe: combining several techniques generally gives better insight. That is exactly the situation of major scenarios (very low probabilities, high intensities).
- Val-des-Pins : probability of a BLEVE by fault tree or bow-tie, intensity and effect distances (course Safety report, chapter 4, and course Consequence analysis), barrier reliability and safety integrity level (course “Barriers, LOPA and quantification”, chapter 1).
Risk evaluation (6.4.4)
Purpose: support decision-making. The results of the analysis are compared with the established criteria to determine where additional action is needed. This can lead to: doing nothing further; considering treatment options; undertaking further analysis; maintaining existing controls; reconsidering objectives. Cost, durability and ease of implementation are to be considered, as are the actual consequences and perceived for stakeholders. The outcome is recorded, communicated and validated at appropriate levels.
Which technique for which step? (IEC 31010:2019)
| Step | Techniques common in industrial safety | Where to learn it |
|---|---|---|
| Identification | Brainstorming, checklists, what-if (SWIFT), preliminary hazard analysis (PHA), HAZOP, FMEA | Safety report, chapter 3; Industrial risks |
| Analysis of causes and consequences | Fault trees, event trees, bow-tie, effect modelling | Safety report, chapter 4; Consequence analysis |
| Analysis of controls | Reliability analysis (PFD), SIL, LOPA | “Barriers, LOPA and quantification”, chapter 1; Functional safety: SIS and SIL |
| Assessment | Criticality matrices, acceptability criteria, cost-benefit analysis, ALARP | lessons 1-5 and 1-7; Industrial risks, lesson 3-5 |
IEC 31010:2019 describes these techniques with their uses and limits (lesson 1-1).
A calculated probability depends on generic data, modelling assumptions and on the barriers being kept in good condition. ISO 31000 requires these limits to be made explicit: a quantitative result without its uncertainties is incomplete (principle f).