Chapter 1 · Lesson 1.2
Which method to choose: PHA, FMEA, HAZOP, fault tree, bow-tie
No single method covers the whole analysis: we choose according to the system, the timing and the depth required.
| PHA | FMEA | HAZOP | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Purpose | Hazards and hazardous situations of a system or installation | Failures of the components or functions of an item of equipment | Operating deviations of a process, especially flows of material and energy |
| Starting point | Hazard checklists | Failure modes of each component | Guide words applied to parameters, node by node |
| Inputs | General description, products, environment, lessons learned | Breakdown, drawings, bill of materials | Up-to-date process drawings (P&IDs), description, safety data sheets |
| Team | Small group | Designer, reliability engineer, maintenance, operator | Multidisciplinary team of 5 to 8 with a facilitator and a secretary |
| When | Start of a project or overall analysis | Design of an item of equipment; reliability, maintenance | Detailed design of a unit, modification, before start-up |
| Limitation | Little detail | Heavy if there are many components | Long, several sessions |
Complementary methods
- Thefault tree works back from the effect to the causes for a serious event: it makes it possible to count the combinations of failures and to calculate a probability.
- The bow-tie combines this tree (on the left) with an event tree (on the right) around the TE and highlights the barriers.
Usual sequence
PHA of the whole installation, then HAZOP or FMEA on the most critical parts, then fault tree and bow-tie on the most serious scenarios.
Source: “Industrial risks” course (lesson 8-6).