Chapter 1 · Lesson 1.4
The accidents that shaped the approach
Functional safety standards formalise lessons drawn from accidents where an instrumented protection existed on paper, but did not work on the day it was needed.
Two emblematic cases
| Accident | What happened (summary) | Lesson for functional safety |
|---|---|---|
| Texas City (refinery, United States, March 2005) | During a restart, a column is overfilled. Its only level transmitter, known to be faulty (repair deferred until after start-up) and wrongly calibrated, shows a falling level; the redundant high-level alarm does not work. The liquid overflows to a blowdown drum that vents the vapours to the atmosphere; they ignite and the explosion kills 15 people. | Safety instruments that were faulty and untested; starting up with safety instruments known to be faulty; a redundant alarm never tested, hence in hidden failure; transient modes (start-up) poorly covered. |
| Buncefield (oil depot, United Kingdom, December 2005) | A tank overflows during filling: the level gauge is stuck and the very-high-level switch, meant to stop the filling, is inoperative. The vapour cloud explodes. | A shutdown function on very high level must be tested, maintained and independent of the control measurement; management of bypasses and faults matters as much as design. |
Summary based on the public investigation reports (Chemical Safety Board for Texas City, official British reports for Buncefield, where the fire caused no deaths); refer to these reports before any precise citation.
What always comes back
- Hidden failure: the instrument has been out of order for a long time, without anyone knowing, for lack of a test or diagnostic.
- Dependence: the protection uses the same measurement, the same power supply or the same PLC as what failed.
- Bypass: a function was bypassed for a good reason, then forgotten.
- Modification: a change to the installation was not reflected in the protection.
The rest of the course answers these four points: tests and reliability data (chapter 3), architectures and common causes (chapter 4), verification (chapter 5), operation, bypasses and modifications (chapter 6).
Updated: October 2026. Sources: public investigation reports and concordant secondary sources (dates, Texas City toll, level transmitter and redundant alarm at Texas City, failure of the gauge and of the very-high-level switch at Buncefield).
- Accidents show protections that were present on paper and absent on the day.
- Four recurring causes: hidden failure, dependence, bypass, modification.