Aurorisk FR

Chapter 1 · Lesson 1.1

From risk to safety function

A hazardous installation is protected by several successive layers. When a layer is an automatic system that measures, decides and acts, it is called a safety instrumented function. Functional safety is the discipline that ensures such a function will do what is expected of it, with the reliability that was asked of it.

Chapter objectives
  • Tell process control, alarm, safety instrumented function and mechanical protection apart
  • Place IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 and know who applies what
  • Distinguish low and high demand and know the four SIL levels
  • Link the approach to the accidents that motivated it

The running case: a gas separator drum

A (fictional) gas treatment unit includes a separator drum, V-201, which separates liquids from the gas before compression. If the gas outlet is blocked (control valve closed by mistake, plugging), the pressure rises. Beyond the design pressure, the drum may rupture: this is the hazardous event.

Several protections already exist: pressure control, a high-pressure alarm that asks the operator to act, a relief valve. The risk study concludes that a safety instrumented function (SIF) is needed in addition: three pressure transmitters, a safety PLC and two shutdown valves that cut the gas inlet.

The role of barriers, their confidence level and their PFD are presented in the Industrial risks course (lesson 9-5).

Structure of the safety instrumented function of the separator drumThree pressure transmitters vote two out of three to a safety PLC, which commands two shutdown valves installed in series, each one enough to cut the inlet. Sensors (2oo3) PT-201 A PT-201 B PT-201 C SafetyPLC Final elements (1oo2) XV-201 A XV-201 B
A SIF breaks down into three subsystems: what measures, what decides, what acts. The PFD of the function is the sum of those of the three subsystems.

This case does not describe any real installation. All its values are example assumptions, fixed once and for all and reused in the chapters, case studies and quizzes.

Vocabulary

TermWhat it meansIn the case
BPCS (basic process control system)The automation that runs the process: control loops, sequencesThe pressure control of the drum
Safety functionWhat must be done to reach or maintain a safe state, facing a specific hazardCut the gas inlet if the pressure exceeds a threshold
SIF (safety instrumented function)A safety function performed by instrumentation: sensors, logic, final elementsPT-201 A/B/C, safety PLC, XV-201 A/B
SIS (safety instrumented system)All the hardware and software that performs one or more SIFsThe unit’s safety PLC and all its sensors and valves
SIL (safety integrity level)A reliability class required of a SIF (1 to 4)SIL 2 for the drum SIF (chapter 2)

One layer among others

Protection layers around the processSix concentric layers, from the process at the centre to emergency plans on the outside: control and BPCS, alarms and operator, SIS, mechanical protections, physical protections, emergency plans. Emergency plans (on-site and off-site) Physical protections (bund, wall, distance) Mechanical protections (relief valve, rupture disc) Safety instrumented system (SIS) Alarms and operator action Process control (BPCS) Process
Each layer must be independent of the others to count in the analysis: the SIS is only one layer among others.

The SIS is not the only protection, and it is not the first. The logical order is to reduce the risk at the source (design), then through control, then through barriers. Functional safety does not replace a safe design: it deals with the risk that remains.

Independence

A layer only counts if it is independent of the initiating event and of the other layers. A SIF that uses the same transmitter as the failing control loop protects against nothing: if the transmitter lies, the control loop and the SIF are wrong together.

Key takeaway
  • A SIF measures, decides and acts to bring the process back to a safe state facing a specific hazard.
  • The SIS is one layer among others: it deals with the risk that remains after a safe design.
  • A layer only counts if it is independent of the initiating event and of the other layers.