Chapter 1 · Lesson 1.4
Independent protection layers (IPL) and their PFDs
An IPL is a safety barrier able, on its own, to stop the scenario from reaching its consequence, and independent of the initiating event and of the other layers. It can be technical, organisational or human.
The inner layers prevent the event, the outer layers limit its consequences: an outer layer does not reduce the frequency of the top event, it limits its severity.
Criteria for a barrier to be an IPL
- Independence with respect to the initiator and the other IPLs (no common sensor, logic, actuator, power supply or operator).
- Effectiveness : it prevents the consequence when called upon, with compatible kinetics.
- Auditability : its PFD can be justified by tests, data and documented maintenance.
Usual PFD values
| IPL | Usual PFD |
|---|---|
| Control loop (BPCS) | 10−1 |
| Operator response to an alarm | 10−1 |
| Safety valve | 10−2 |
| Well-designed pressure vessel | 10−4 (or better depending on maintenance) |
| SIS | 10−1 à 10−4 depending on the SIL (PFD calculationavg) |
In the LOPA literature (CCPS 2001, relayed by secondary summaries), the orders of magnitude are 0.1 for an operator response within 30 minutes with alarm and training, 0.1 for the BPCS, 0.01 for a correctly sized safety valve (possible range of 10−1 à 10−5 depending on service conditions), and 10−2 à 10−4 for a SIL 1 to 3 SIS. Each value credited in a study must be justified: design, tests, maintenance and operating experience of the barrier.
Direct calculation for an SIS
PFDavg = λDU · TI / 2 (see lesson 4-2 of the course on SIS and SIL); the value obtained is interpreted via the SIL (SIL 1 to 4).
Two barriers that rely on the same sensor are not independent. An alarm followed by an operator action is a single IPL, not two. An IPL must be in working order when called upon (tests, maintenance, bypasses).