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Chapter 1 · Lesson 1.6

Modelling an attack: kill chain, ATT&CK and attack trees

To reason about attacks without getting lost in details, they are modelled as generic steps. Three complementary tools: the Cyber Kill Chain, the MITRE ATT&CK base and the attack tree.

Four generic phases

  1. Know: collection of information and tools (preparatory phase).
  2. Get in: access the system and be able to act in it.
  3. Find (optional): discover the information or elements to attack.
  4. Exploit: produce the damage (breach of CIA).

Example: an attack on Sanidis

The four phases of an attack on Sanidis and the measure that stops it at each phaseFour columns. Know: the attacker spots targets in the directory, on social networks and at the provider; measure: limit public information and raise awareness. Get in: a booby-trapped email opened by an adviser; measure: email filtering and session locking. Find: exploring the network and spotting the server and the customer files; measure: segregation and limited rights. Exploit: copying the files, encrypting the server and ransom; measure: logs, detection and offline backup.1 · KnowSpots targetsdirectory, socialnetworks, providerLimit publicinformation, raise awareness2 · Get inBooby-trapped emailan adviser opensthe attachmentEmail filtering,session locking3 · FindExplores the networkspots the server andthe customer filesSegregated network,limited rights4 · ExploitCopies the files,encrypts the server,demands a ransomLogs, detection,offline backup
Attacker’s actionDefence measure
Interrupting the sequence at any phase makes the attack fail: several successive barriers are worth more than a single one.

The Cyber Kill Chain

Cyber Kill Chain in seven steps Seven successive steps: reconnaissance, weaponisation, delivery, exploitation, installation, command and control, actions on objectives, with the phases know, get in, find, exploit and the associated defensive countermeasures. 1 Recon-naissance 2 Weaponisation 3 Delivery 4 Exploi-tation 5 Installation 6 Commandand control 7 Actions onobjectives KNOWGET INFIND / PERSISTEXPLOIT Defence: break the chain as early as possible monitoring and reducing exposure · filtering and awareness · patches and hardening application allowlisting · segmentation and detection · incident response, backups

MITRE ATT&CK

Public knowledge base of tactics (objectives: the “why”), techniques and sub-techniques (the “how”) observed in real attacks, linked to groups, software and campaigns. Three matrices: Enterprise, Mobile and ICS.

Course stepCorresponding ATT&CK Enterprise tactics
KnowReconnaissance, Resource Development
Get inInitial Access, Execution, Privilege Escalation, Persistence, Stealth and Defense Impairment (formerly Defense Evasion)
FindCredential Access, Discovery, Lateral Movement, Collection
ExploitCommand and Control, Exfiltration, Impact

Indicative matching: some tactics (privilege escalation, persistence, evasion) recur across several phases.

Obsolescence to know: with ATT&CK version 19 (April 2026), the Defense Evasion tactic of the Enterprise matrix was split into two tactics, Stealth and Defense Impairment; the Enterprise matrix then has 15 tactics. Older materials that speak of a single “Defense Evasion” tactic must be read with this change in mind. Technique references change with each version: always cite the version.

ATT&CK for ICS

The attack tree

The attacker’s goal is the root; the branches are alternative (OR) or cumulative (AND) means; the leaves are elementary actions, to which difficulty, cost, probability or detectability are attached to identify the most likely path and the points where to place a barrier.

Attack tree: stop a production line through the network Root: disrupt production. Two OR branches: compromise the supervision workstation, or reach the PLCs directly. The first breaks down into stealing credentials (phishing) AND remote access without MFA, or infected removable media. The second goes through an unsegregated network. Goal: disrupt production(root) OR · compromise supervision OR · reach the PLCs AND · credential theft(phishing) AND · remote accesswithout MFA unsegregatedIT/OT network infectedremovable media Barriers: MFA, awareness, industrial DMZ, media control
Reminder: an attack tree is a defensive reasoning tool. It stops at the level of generic means and is not used to describe technical procedures.

Attack scenarios as states and actions

A scenario can also be described as a chain of states (“has credentials”, “session open”, “privileged mode”, “reaches the target workstation”) linked by actions and conditioned by vulnerabilities; this representation brings technical analysis closer to risk analysis (EBIOS RM operational scenarios).

Updated: October 2026. Sources: Lockheed Martin, Intelligence-Driven Computer Network Defense (2011); MITRE ATT&CK (version 19 of 2026 and its minor updates); Assante and Lee, The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain (SANS, 2015). The ATT&CK ICS matrix has twelve tactics, two of them specific to industrial systems: “Inhibit Response Function” and “Impair Process Control”.

Game: the Cyber Kill Chain in order

Put the seven steps of an intrusion in order.